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DESCENT AND LANDING TRIGGERS FOR THE ORION MULTI-
PURPOSE CREW VEHICLE EXPLORATION FLIGHT TEST-1 
 
Brian D. Bihari,* Charity J. Duke,† Jeffrey D. Semrau‡ 
 
The Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) will perform a flight test 
known as Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT-1) currently scheduled for 2014.  One 
of the primary functions of this test is to exercise all of the important Guidance, 
Navigation, Control (GN&C), and Propulsion systems, along with the flight 
software for future flights.  The Descent and Landing segment of the flight is 
governed by the requirements levied on the GN&C system by the Landing and 
Recovery System (LRS).  The LRS is a complex system of parachutes and flight 
control modes that ensure that the Orion MPCV safely lands at its designated 
target in the Pacific Ocean.  The Descent and Landing segment begins with the 
jettisoning of the Forward Bay Cover and concludes with sensing touchdown.  
This paper discusses the requirements, design, testing, analysis and performance 
of the current EFT-1 Descent and Landing Triggers flight software. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
   The Orion Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT-1) mission is an unmanned space 
flight utilizing the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Orion Crew Module 
(CM).  One of the main purposes of this flight test is to test various MPCV 
systems prior to manned missions.  This early flight will allow engineers to test 
the Guidance, Navigation, Control (GN&C) and Propulsion systems necessary 
for the entry portion of flight.  Figure 1 shows the flight mission profile.1 
 
 
 
Figure 1: EFT-1 Mission Profile 
 
The Orion capsule is a similar shape to the Apollo Command Module but scaled up to allow for a crew 
of up to four on missions beyond earth orbit such as to an asteroid, the Moon or Mars.   
                                                 
* Orion Entry MODE Team, UTC Aerospace Systems, 2224 Bay Area Blvd, Houston, TX 77058 
† Orion GN&C, Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company, 12257 South Wadsworth Blvd, Littleton, CO  80127 
‡ Orion Entry MODE Team, Honeywell Inc., 2525 Bay Area Blvd, Ste 200, Houston, TX 77058 
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CHALLENGES 
 
The Orion Landing and Recovery System (LRS) has undergone a vast array of changes since the 
program’s inception.  It has proven to be one of the most challenging, complex, and evolving systems on 
the spacecraft.  Several trade studies and assessments have been performed across multiple disciplines and 
subsystems to address this phase of flight.  The primary drivers of these studies are safety, reliability, and 
cost.  Changes to mission objectives, program requirements, vehicle mass properties, and GN&C 
subsystems have all led to updates of the LRS.  Some of the major issues that have had to be overcome 
include: changes to the vehicle mass properties and outer mold line, limiting the vehicle vertical descent 
rate (e.g. landing loads on vehicle and crew), changes to the aerodynamics (or our understanding of them) 
of the vehicle, ability to control the heading error at touchdown, sensing of touchdown, and systems 
failures (e.g. navigation degradation, parachute failures, Reaction Control System (RCS) failures, etc.).  A 
few of the major trade studies that have been examined to address the LRS system include: land vs. water 
landings;  crew size (7 to 4); segmented vs. monolithic Forward Bay Cover (FBC);  FBC removal (FBC 
parachutes, drogues, thrusters, airbags);  landing retro-rockets, confluence retros, anti-tipover rockets; 
landing airbags of various configurations; parachute attachment and confluence point; changes to the 
vehicle hang angle under the chutes; textile vs. steel parachute risers;  use of a torque riser (anti-twist 
keeper); the number, types, sizes, reefing schedules, and porosity of various parachutes; chute deployment 
architectures (e.g. drogue deployed main parachutes); various navigation systems (GPS, baro-altimeter, 
IMU);  the number, size, thrust and orientation of Reaction Control System (RCS) system and its use under 
the parachutes; and the number, size, location and shape of Command Module Up-righting System 
(CMUS) airbags.2.3  All of the trades and challenges listed above have had a direct impact on the LRS 
sequence and thus consequently on the Descent and Landing Triggers Flight Software (DLTRIG FSW) 
which is responsible for ensuring the LRS events occur as designed. 
 
DESCENT AND LANDING REQUIREMENTS 
 
A set of GN&C requirements generated by NASA and the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin will be 
evaluated for the LRS during the EFT-1 mission.  These requirements include:  drogue parachute 
deployment conditions, landing accuracy, landing orientation of the capsule, vertical descent rate, RCS 
shutoff, and touchdown detection.  Additionally, EFT-1 Flight Test Objectives include the demonstration of 
the jettison of the Forward Bay Cover and drogue and main parachute deployment and release.  Figure 2 
shows the flow for the descent and landing requirements.4 
 
Figure 2: Descent and Landing Requirements Flow 
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NOMINAL LANDING AND RECOVERY SEQUENCE 
 
For the EFT-1 mission, the Orion capsule is targeted to perform a water landing (under a set of 
parachutes) in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of southern California.  The nominal Descent and Landing 
sequence is depicted below in Figure 3.  The sequence begins with the mortar deployment of three Forward 
Bay Cover Parachutes (FBCP) and the turning off of the RCS ().  This is followed by the release of the 
Forward Bay Cover (FBC) and mortar deployment of two drogue parachutes ().  The RCS is re-activated 
and used to damp the vehicle roll rates under the drogues ().  Once the drogue parachutes have performed 
their function of lowering CM velocity and the CM is at an optimal state to release the drogues, the RCS 
system is again turned off, the drogues are cut away. Immediately after the drogues are cut away, three pilot 
chutes are mortar deployed (), which upon their inflation each will extract a main chute.  Between the 
release of the drogue chutes and the inflation of the main chutes, the CM is in free fall.  Once the main 
chutes have fully inflated the RCS system is turned back on to reduce the twisting of the main parachute 
lines and then to provide the required landing orientation ().  The capsule then descends under the main 
parachutes until splashdown ().  After touchdown is sensed, the main parachutes are jettisoned, the RCS 
system will be turned off, the CMUS airbags are inflated and the vehicle GN&C system shut down. A 
rescue boat will then arrive at the landing site to secure and recover the vehicle. 
 
 
Figure 3: Landing and Recover Systems Sequence 
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DESCENT AND LANDING TRIGGERS FLIGHT SOFTWARE DESIGN5  
 
Overview 
The Descent and Landing Triggers (DLTRIG) Flight Software (FSW) is designed to operate during the 
descent and landing phases of flight.  It outputs the following four variables: 
1. Command to deploy the FBC parachutes 
2. Command to jettison the drogue parachutes 
3. The current vehicle control mode (to be used by the controls FSW) 
4. Flag indicating if the touchdown of the Crew Module has been detected 
 
It should be noted that the DLTRIG FSW does not actually command the deployment of the FBC 
parachutes or the jettison of the drogue parachutes; it merely determines if GN&C is ready for these events 
to occur and passes those commands on to the Timeline and Vehicle Manager (TVM) software, which is 
responsible for the firing of the pyros based on GN&C’s recommendation and other system considerations. 
 
The interface between DLTRIG and other elements of the FSW is depicted in Figure 4 below. 
 
 
Figure 4: Descent and Landing Triggers Flight Software Interfaces 
 
The navigation software provides velocity, acceleration, attitude, angular rates, altitude, and altitude 
hardware source.  Inputs are also provided to DLTRIG from the Timeline and Vehicle Manager software 
indicating whether or not the applicable pyros have already been commanded to fire.  After DLTRIG 
processes the input data, the software outputs a FBC chute deploy command, a drogue chute jettison 
command, and the touchdown detected flag to the Timeline and Vehicle Manager.  It also outputs the 
current control mode to the controls FSW. 
 
DLTRIG begins monitoring the conditions for FBC Chute Deploy command starting at Entry Interface.   
Arming of the FBC and drogue pyros occurs at a set time from Entry Interface to provide sufficient time in 
case the backup velocity trigger is needed. 
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Control Modes 
There are four different control modes that can be set by the DLTRIG FSW and sent to the controls 
FSW to be implemented.  These four modes and listed and described below: 
 
Table 1: CM Control Modes for Descent and Landing Phases of Flight 
CM Control Mode Description 
RCS Inhibited Inhibits the firing of the RCS thrusters 
Drogue Rate Damping Damps the heading error rate while under drogue chutes 
Main Anti-Twist Prevents the twist-up of the main parachute lines 
Landing Reorient Aligns the body roll with the velocity vector to meet 
structural requirements for touchdown 
 
During a nominal entry (with an aided altitude source), the descent and landing control mode is 
determined based on a combination of altitude triggers and timers as illustrated below: 
 
 
Figure 5: Touchdown Control Mode Relative & Geodetic Altitude4 
 
During a contingency (with an un-aided altitude source), the descent and landing control mode is based 
largely on timers. 
 
Nominal and Contingency Operations 
The operational mode of the DLTRIG FSW is largely tied to the health of the navigation subsystem.  
During nominal entry scenarios, the altitude is derived from either the vehicle’s Global Positioning System 
(GPS) or the baro-altimeter.  In this case, events are triggered using a combination of elapsed-time, vehicle 
rate, and altitude conditions.   
 
During contingency entry scenarios, the navigated altitude is not aided by the GPS or baro-altimeter.  In 
this case, events use the backup logic that is based on either vehicle velocity or timers.  The detailed 
DLTRIG logic employed in the nominal and contingency situations is explored in the subsequent sections. 
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NOMINAL DLTRIG LOGIC5 
 
The nominal logic for the FBC parachute deploy command, drogue parachute jettison command, and 
vehicle control mode is employed when the navigated altitude is aided by either the GPS or the baro-
altimeter.  The nominal logic for the touchdown detection flag is used when there is a sufficient 
deceleration upon touchdown (i.e. not a soft landing).  A generic representation of the nominal DLTRIG 
architecture is provided in Figure 6 below.  Red lines indicate events that are controlled by the Descent and 
Landing Triggers FSW and black lines indicate events that are controlled (via timers) through the Timeline 
and Vehicle Manager software.   
 
The values for the altitude and timer triggers were determined using a combination of tests including: 
Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) parachute drop tests, integrated GN&C simulation analysis 
and aerodynamic wind tunnel and Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) testing. 
 
 
Figure 6: Descent and Landing Triggers Nominal Logic 
 
The FBC chute deploy is commanded once either of the following two conditions are met:  
1. The vehicle is below the required FBC chute deploy altitude ceiling and the Smart FBC chute 
logic commands a deploy (additional information on the Smart FBC logic is provided in the 
next section) 
2. The vehicle drops below the FBC chute deploy altitude floor 
 
After the FBC chute deploy is commanded (and TVM deploys the chutes), TVM commands the jettison 
of the FBC based on a timer.  A second TVM-based timer commands the deployment of the CM drogue 
chutes.   
 
Next, the drogue chute jettison is commanded when either of the following two conditions are met: 
1. The drogue chute disreef timer has expired, the vehicle is below the drogue jettison altitude 
ceiling, and the Smart Drogue Release logic commands a deploy (additional information on 
the Smart Drogue Release logic is provided in the next section) 
2. The vehicle drops below the drogue jettison altitude floor 
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After the drogue chute jettison is commanded (and TVM jettisons the drogue chutes), TVM commands 
the deployment of the main pilot chutes (and consequently the main chutes) after the appropriate timer is 
complete. 
 
Finally, the touchdown detected flag is set when a sufficient deceleration is sensed (additional 
information is provided below).  The following sections give a more detailed explanation of the Smart FBC 
chute deploy logic, the Smart Drogue Release logic, and the touchdown detection logic. 
 
Smart FBC Parachute Deploy 
If the FBC has not yet been jettisoned, DLTRIG begins checking for the correct conditions to deploy the 
FBC Parachutes.  Ideally, FBC chute deploy is initiated at the FBC chute deploy altitude floor.  To ensure 
that the vehicle does not flip over before the altitude floor is reached, the Smart FBC Chute Deploy logic is 
employed.  The Smart logic is enabled once the vehicle is below the defined FBC Chute Deploy ceiling 
altitude.  This logic monitors the root-sum-square (RSS) of the pitch and yaw body rates (using filtered 
IMUs rates).  If this value exceeds a specified threshold, the FBC Chute Deploy will be commanded.  If the 
RSS of the pitch and yaw rates remains below the threshold, the FBC Chute Deploy will be commanded 
once the FBC Chute Deploy floor altitude is reached. Refer to Figure 7 for a plot of the operation of the 
Smart FBC Chute Deploy logic. 
 
 
Figure 7: RSS of Pitch and Yaw Rates for Smart FBC Chute Deploy  
Within the Altitude Ceiling and Floor Limits4  
 
Smart Drogue Release 
During the time under drogue parachutes the aerodynamic forces and moments can cause the CM to 
oscillate severely.  If the drogue chutes are released at a high rate state of the CM, the CM could potentially 
flip over during deployment of the main chutes.  To decrease the likelihood of this occurrence, the Smart 
Drogue Release (SDR) logic was developed.  This logic monitors body rates and attempts to command a 
release of the drogues when the CM rates are at their optimal state.  
 
The SDR logic calculates the RSS of the pitch (q) and yaw (r) body rates using the filtered IMU rates.  
It then detects the peaks and troughs in the oscillation of the RSS of the pitch and yaw rate magnitude.  
When the rate magnitude is increasing, the SDR logic is in an ascending state.  When the rate magnitude is 
decreasing, the SDR logic is in a descending state.  When the logic switches from an ascending state to a 
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descending state, a potential peak is found.  When the logic switches from a descending state to an 
ascending state, a potential trough is found.   
 
Filtered IMU rates are used in SDR logic, however, some high frequency noise is still present in these 
rate signals.  Persistence checks are implemented for the detection of the rate state, peaks and troughs to 
ensure that the rate states, peaks, and troughs are properly detected.  Without persistence, noise in the signal 
could be improperly detected as an ascending/descending rate or a peak/trough and the SDR logic would 
not perform as desired. 
 
After the peak and trough are detected, the oscillation fraction is calculated.  This fraction indicates 
where the vehicle is in the oscillation sinusoid and is defined below: 
 
ܱݏ݈݈ܿ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊_ܨݎܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ൌ 	ܴܽݐ݁஻௢ௗ௬ െ 	ܴܽݐ்݁௥௢௨௚௛ܴܽݐ݁௉௘௔௞ െ ܴܽݐ்݁௥௢௨௚௛  
 
Where all rates are magnitudes derived from the RSS of the pitch and yaw rates.  Using this oscillation 
fraction, the triggers are evaluated.  Two triggers exist: one for the ascending state and one for the 
descending state.  If the Smart Drogue Release state is ascending and the oscillation fraction is less than the 
ascending trigger, the Smart Drogue Release command will be set high.  If the state is descending and the 
oscillation fraction is less than the descending trigger, the Smart Drogue Release command will be set high.  
Otherwise the Smart Drogue Release command remains low. 
 
If the RSS of the pitch and yaw body rates is below a specified value, all the previous logic is ignored 
and the Smart Drogue Release command is set high regardless of the oscillation fraction.  This logic is used 
in cases where CM rates under the drogues are so low that a successful release can be commanded at any 
point in the oscillation.  
 
Figure 8 demonstrates the operation of the Smart Drogue Release logic.  In this figure the peak/trough 
detection persistence is set to zero. 
 
Figure 8: Smart Drogue Release Logic Functional Example 
 
As can be seen from the first subplot in Figure 8, a peak is detected immediately when the rate state 
goes from ascending to descending (and similar logic for trough detection).   The rate state is shown in the 
second subplot: white shading indicates an ascending state and gray shading indicates a descending state.  
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The computed oscillation fraction is also shown in this plot.  In this case, the ascending trigger is set to zero 
so that the SDR command can never be set high when the rates are ascending.  This prevents the command 
from being set high when the actual rates are higher than desired due to latency in the filter.  For this 
example, the descending trigger is set to 0.5.  Accordingly when the rate state is descending and the 
oscillation fraction is below the 0.5 limit (~50% of the way between the peak and the trough), the SDR 
command will be set high, as can be seen in the second and third subplots in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 9 shows the use of the Drogue Jettison occurring between the ceiling and floor when the SDR 
logic has been set. 
 
Figure 9: Smart Drogue Release Logic within the Altitude Ceiling and Floor Limits5 
 
Tuning of the SDR trigger values to yield optimal results was performed running a parametric analysis 
of CM performance in the GN&C simulation for a variety of trigger values.  Monte Carlo sets of 500 runs 
were executed for this task.  All analyses performed to tune SDR trigger values were done with the 
expected max mass value of the CM and with one drogue disabled in the simulation.  This configuration 
was used because it generates the most stressful CM rates, velocities, Mach numbers, and dynamic 
pressures at drogue release.  It has been demonstrated in multiple simulations and by analytical analysis7,8 
that two drogues can easily counteract the unstable CM aerodynamic moments currently predicted for the 
CM in the subsonic regime.  With two drogues active, the current best estimate is that in 3,000 Monte 
Carlos sets none of the runs result in a CM flip or an apex forward orientation in the time period between 
drogue release and main deploy.  However, in a one drogue situation the CM/drogue system is at best 
neutrally stable (and even then only once the drogue is fully open). 
 
For reference, the typical time period between drogue release and inflation of the main chutes is 
approximately 3 seconds.  Due to system constraints, the RCS cannot be fired in this time period to 
maintain optimal CM attitude; hence the need to implement the SDR logic that minimizes the risk of the 
CM going apex forward during main parachute deployment.  The consequences of the CM flipping or 
going apex forward during main deployment include fouling the main parachutes so that they are damaged 
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during deployment or cannot deploy at all, damaging the main risers such that they subsequently fail during 
inflation of the mains, or contact between the chute riser lines and the CM that damage CM structural 
components.  All of these consequences can result in a loss of the EFT-1 test vehicle. 
 
A simplified version of the SDR logic was used in the Orion Pad Abort 1 (PA-1) test which was flown 
in May 2010.  The primary distinction between SDR in PA-1 and EFT-1 is PA-1 SDR did not have 
persistence monitoring of the RSS q/r rate magnitude as part of its logic.  PA-1 analysis of SDR showed it 
was optimal to release drogues only on descending rate magnitude of the RSS q/r, never on an ascending 
rate.  
 
The data from the Monte Carlo sets showed that lowering the descending trigger results in fewer 
predicted flips of the CM deployment.  A lower descending trigger means the drogues will be release on a 
lower rate magnitude. Lower rates at drogue release assist in preventing the CM from going apex forward 
during main parachute deploy.  The descending trigger value needs to be balanced against persistence and 
the typical rate frequency of the CM under the drogues.  The typical frequency of the CM rate under the 
drogues is 0.5 Hz (2 sec).  Configuring SDR to only release on any descending rate results in the SDR 
command on for only 1 sec of the rate cycle, a descending trigger of 0.5 lowers the time the SDR command 
can be on to 500 msec.  The DLTRIG FSW executes at 40 Hz (25 msec).  A persistence value of 3 lowers 
the time the SDR command is on in a typical rate oscillation to 425 msec.  If one were to lower the 
descending trigger too low SDR would never satisfy its criteria to release drogues at an optimal rate.  This 
would result in the drogues always being released at the SDR altitude floor regardless of the rates.  This 
would result in an unacceptable risk of the CM going apex forward during main parachute deploy.   
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Touchdown Detection 
The nominal logic used to detect touchdown is based on vehicle acceleration.  This logic is employed 
regardless of the altitude source (i.e. the altitude does not have to be aided by the GPS or baro-altimeter).  
The nominal touchdown detection logic is evaluated once a specified time since drogue chutes jettison has 
elapsed and the vehicle is below an altitude threshold (or the altitude source un-aided).  . 
 
Once these initial conditions have been met, the vehicle acceleration is evaluated using 200 Hz 
acceleration data from the selected IMU.  Since this data is provided at 200 Hz and the DLTRIG FSW is 
run at 40 Hz, a loop is set up in the Touchdown Detection logic to evaluate each sample from the IMUs.  
During each execution of this loop, the IMU sample is filtered using a second order Infinite Impulse 
Response (IIR) filter and then sent through a lever arm correction to find the acceleration at the center of 
gravity (CG) of the vehicle. 
 
Once the acceleration vector of the vehicle at the CG is determined, the magnitude of the acceleration 
vector is taken.  This acceleration magnitude is then checked against two separate limits: the RCS 
Acceleration Threshold and the Touchdown Acceleration Threshold.  The RCS Acceleration Threshold is 
set less than the Touchdown Acceleration Threshold.  The RCS Acceleration Threshold ensures the 
shutdown of the RCS at touchdown prior to submersion.  The separate Touchdown Acceleration Threshold 
allows greater assurance of an actual Touchdown prior to transitioning to transitioning the FSW to its post-
landing mode.  If the calculated acceleration magnitude is greater than the RCS Acceleration Threshold and 
the persistence limit has been met, the CM RCS is inhibited.  If the acceleration magnitude is greater than 
the Touchdown Acceleration Threshold and the persistence limit has been met, the Touchdown Detected 
flag is set high and the CM RCS is inhibited. 
 
The touchdown acceleration persistence limit is illustrated in Figure 10.  The acceleration magnitude 
must be above the defined threshold for the specified number of times before either the CM Touchdown 
Control Mode or Touchdown Detection flags are set.  Separate persistence limits are implemented for each 
of the flags to meet desired performance and safety characteristics. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Touchdown Detection Threshold and Use of the Persistence Counter 
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CONTINGENCY DLTRIG LOGIC5 
 
The contingency logic for the FBC parachute deploy command, drogue parachute jettison command, 
and vehicle control mode is employed when the navigated altitude is not aided by either the GPS or the 
baro-altimeter.  The contingency logic for the touchdown detection flag is used when a sufficient 
deceleration is not produced upon touchdown (i.e. a soft landing). A generic representation of the 
contingency logic is provided in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11: Descent and Landing Triggers Contingency Triggers 
 
First, the FBC chute deploy is commanded using a backup velocity trigger.  After this command is set 
(and TVM commands the FBC chute deploy), the FBC jettison and CM drogue deploy are commanded by 
TVM based on timers. 
 
Next, the drogue chute jettison is commanded when either of the following two conditions are met: 
1. The time since drogue deploy is passed the minimum required time and the Smart Drogue 
Release logic commands a deploy  
2. The time since drogue deploy passes the maximum available time 
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After the drogue chute jettison is commanded (and TVM jettisons the drogue chutes), TVM commands 
the deployment of the main pilot chutes (and consequently the main chutes) after the appropriate timer is 
complete. 
 
Finally, the touchdown detected flag is set when the vehicle drops below a specified altitude and a timer 
expires.  If during descent under the chutes the altitude source returns to nominal (aided by the GPS or 
baro-altimeter) the DLTRIG FSW will revert back to the normal operations mode.  The following sections 
give a more detailed explanation of the FBC chute velocity trigger and touchdown detection contingency 
logic. 
 
FBC Parachute Velocity Trigger 
If the navigated altitude is not aided by GPS or the baro-altimeter, the altitude-independent contingency 
FBC chute deploy logic is employed.  This logic checks to see if the computed adjusted velocity magnitude 
is less than or equal to the specified velocity trigger.  The navigated velocity is adjusted to reduce errors by 
using knowledge of the expected “truth” velocity at FBC parachute fire (nominal or mean) based on Monte 
Carlo analysis. 
 
Adjusted_Trigger_Velocity = dot(Nav_Velocity, Reference_Deploy_Velocity) 
 
Tuning of the trigger parameters can be performed by targeting values of FBC parachute deploy 
altitude:  
 
 Biasing trigger low can provide the baro-altimeter with more time to come online; Biasing 
higher reduces number of low deploy altitude or no deployment cases 
 Altitude spreads increase with lower velocity settings 
 
A velocity trigger magnitude must be selected to balance allowing time for the baro-altimeter to become 
valid and insuring a successful chute trigger sequence. A typical value should allow few cases from a 
typical Monte Carlo case to trigger chute deployment above the Maximum deploy altitude and few 
deployments of the Main chutes below the altitude floor.  
 
Selection of a reference deploy velocity vector can be obtained by using the velocity trigger obtained 
above in a nominal run and choosing the simulation truth velocity vector at chute deploy. 
 
Touchdown Detection 
The contingency touchdown detection logic is employed to ensure that the CM RCS is inhibited and the 
touchdown detected flag is set even if the acceleration thresholds are not exceeded (such as in the case of a 
soft landing).  This contingency logic is timer-based and does not rely on the vehicle acceleration.  Note 
that unlike the rest of the Descent and Landing Triggers CSU, the nominal (acceleration-based) logic is 
used if the navigated altitude is not aided by GPS or the baro-altimeter.  The contingency logic is only 
employed if an aided-altitude is available. 
 
This logic starts a timer once the vehicle altitude drops below a specified limit (the navigated altitude 
must be aided by either the GPS or baro-altimeter in order for this timer to start).  Once this timer exceeds 
the specified value, the CM RCS is inhibited and the touchdown detected flag is set high.  If the altitude 
goes above the specified limit, the timer is reset to zero. 
  
14 
 
DLTRIG FSW CODING AND TESTING 
 
The DLTRIG FSW is initially modeled using the MATLAB®/Simulink®/Stateflow® software suite.  The 
model is then autocoded into the C++ Programming Language for use in the GN&C simulations.  Unit 
Tests of the DLTRIG FSW is accomplished via Functional and Structural testing using the SystemTest™ 
utilities.  All of these tools are provided by The MathWorks®, Inc.   
 
Functional tests are created to provide performance tests and functional checkouts that are not feasible 
with mission simulation data.  Structural tests are created to provide coverage of input and parameter 
ranges, logic and model coverage and code tests as described by the Orion Software Development Plan9. 
 
All Orion MPCV FSW code is checked for complexity.  Metrics are taken and tracked for the code 
complexity of each model reference block.  If the complexity is too great, then special provisions are taken 
to ensure that it will function correctly and is tested adequately.  If necessary, a waiver may be requested 
for code that cannot be reduced in complexity.  Portions of the DLTRIG FSW have a high code complexity 
due to the number of IF checks and logic loops.   
 
EFT-1 PERFORMANCE 
 
The GN&C team utilizes the integrated GN&C simulations to perform Monte Carlo analysis dispersing 
several key parameters such as the atmosphere, aerodynamics, mass properties, sensor and effector models 
and system failures.  A typical Monte Carlo set would consist of 3000 individual trajectory simulations.  A 
very small subset of the analysis performed for EFT-1 LRS will be presented herein as examples of what 
the Entry team examines. 
 
Integrated Performance 
Metrics are taken on each Monte Carlo performed and are analyzed by the GN&C engineers.  For the 
descent and landing portion of the EFT-1 mission, these metrics include the amount of propellant used, the 
touchdown target accuracy, and heading error at touchdown.  Figure 12 shows the touchdown and 
parachute deployment envelopes relative to the targeted landing site for a Monte Carlo set without 
navigation system failures.  This case would utilize the Nominal DLTRIG logic.  All of the drogue and 
main parachute deploy and touchdown conditions are tightly grouped around the undispersed trajectory 
(solid black line) and lie within the landing ellipse (outer solid ellipse).  Figure 13 shows the spread of the 
parachute deploy and touchdown conditions for a Monte Carlo case with both the GPS and baro-altimeter 
failed.  This set of Monte Carlos would utilize the Contingency DLTRIG logic.  A much wider spread in 
the result for this case is noted with a few runs exceeding the target by a small amount.  This is due to the 
reduced navigation accuracy, earlier deploy altitudes and longer ride times under the parachutes.  The 
results from both studies show that the Orion vehicle, its subsystems, and flight software are very robust 
and are able to meet vehicle requirements. 
Figure 12: With GPS and Baro Figure 13: Without GPS or Baro 
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Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the Landing Orientation and Touchdown Controller Performance which 
is triggered by the DLTRIG logic.  These plots show the roll with respect to heading at touchdown verses 
horizontal velocity at touchdown in comparison with the envelopes that are applicable for the normal 
impact velocity for each run.  Both sets of these runs use the nominal (non-failed) navigation system and 
thus the Nominal DLTRIG logic.  Figure 14 shows a set of Monte Carlo runs with a normally operating 
RCS system which is allowed to fire one or both strings of RCS jets per firing.  All of the runs in this 
Monte Carlo set lie within the expected heading envelopes and thus show that the control system is 
performing well.   Figure 15 shows a set of Monte Carlo runs that has a failed string of RCS jets and is thus 
only allowed to fire one string of jets per command.  This failure degrades the performance of the system 
and thus the controllability of the heading at touchdown.  Cases that exceeded the landing orientation 
envelopes are marked in red.   
 
                   Low Velocity                Medium Velocity                 High Velocity
Figure 14: Bi-Level RCS 
                 Low Velocity                 Medium Velocity                 High Velocity
 
Figure 15: Single String RCS 
 
Parachute Benchmark Cases 
To easily measure how updates to parachute modeling, atmosphere modeling, CM aerodynamics, CM 
mass, CM RCS performance, etc. affect LRS performance, a benchmark test matrix was developed.  It 
consists of 12 Monte Carlo sets of 3000 runs each with various configurations of the CM and parachutes.  
CM configurations consist of heavy or light mass CM and for RCS, single string or bi-level. Single string is 
when an RCS string is failed and only one string or jet of the dual RCS can be fired. Bi-level both RCS 
strings are active and can be fired if needed.  The parachute configurations consist of nominal, failed 
FBCPs, drogue or mains and/or skipped reefing stages of the drogues or mains.   
Table 2 shows Parachute Benchmark Matrix with the off nominal setups in red. 
 
Table 2: Parachute Benchmark Matrix10  
Run # GRAM 
Month 
CM Mass RCS Number 
of FBCPs 
Number of 
Drogues 
Number of 
Mains 
1 February Heavy Bi-level 3 2 3 
2 February Heavy Single String 3 2 3 
3 February Heavy Bi-level 2 2 3 
4 February Heavy Bi-level 3 1 3 
5 February Heavy Bi-level 3 2 2 
6 February Heavy Single String 3 2 2 
7 February Heavy Bi-level 3 1 2 
8 February Heavy Bi-level 3 1 3 SS1 
9 February Heavy Bi-level 3 2 SS1 3 SS1 
10 February Heavy Bi-level 3 2 SS2 3 SS2 
11 February Light Bi-level 3 2 3 
12 February Light Bi-level 3 1 3 
Note: SS1 = skipped stage 1 and SS2 = skipped stage 2 
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Figure 16 is a co-plot of the vertical velocity at touchdown verses the Monte Carlo run number for cases 
from the Parachute Benchmark Matrix Runs #1 (blue) and #5 (red).  As expected the results with three 
good main parachutes have a lower touchdown velocity that those runs with two good main parachutes.  If 
the parachutes failed to fully inflate or were not deployed in time then the touchdown velocity would be 
exceedingly high.  All of these runs successfully deployed the main parachutes. 
 
Figure 17 is a co-plot of the altitude at which the FBC Parachutes were deployed using the Nominal 
DLTRIG FSW verses the Monte Carlo run number.  The navigation system is setup without failures for 
these simulations.  Blue data points are from the Parachute Benchmark Matrix Run #1 which has a fully 
functional RCS system; while the red data points are from Run #2 which has a failed string of RCS jets.  
The data indicates that all the runs in both sets deployed the FBC Parachutes between the floor and ceiling 
of the deploy box.  A few runs with Bi-level RCS triggered the deployment using the Smart FBC Chute 
Deploy logic due to high vehicle pitch/yaw rates, while the vast majority of the runs were able to deploy 
the FBCPs at the Floor of the window as expected.  The Single String RCS runs showed significantly more 
cases where the rates were high enough to trigger the FBC Chute Deploy logic above the floor (the 
majority of the runs triggered at the floor altitude).  All of these runs are greatly affected by the 
aerodynamics of the vehicle and the effectiveness of the RCS system. 
 
Figure 16: Vertical Velocity at Touchdown for 
2 and 3 Main Parachutes 
Figure 17: Altitude at FBC Chute Deploy for  
Bi-Level and Single String RCS 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED 
 
Due to system constraints, CM aerodynamics, parachute configuration, etc. it appears unlikely to 
develop a SDR algorithm that can eliminate all flips of the CM during main parachute deployment for one 
drogue situations.  
 
High CM rates underneath one drogue parachute are a consequence of choosing a single point 
attachment configuration for the drogues versus a three point harness system with a confluence fitting for 
the drogue risers.  The single attach point was selected because it was less complicated to rig, had lower 
volume requirements, was easier to pack under the FBC and was less likely to foul during deployment than 
the harness system.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Descent and Landing Triggers Flight Software continues to evolve and improve with every update 
of the Orion MPCV Flight Software.  Updates and improvements in the teams understanding of the 
navigation systems, aerodynamics, parachute systems, control systems and atmosphere greatly influence 
the design and trigger selections for the DLTRIG FSW.  The current design has been thoroughly tested and 
inspected and it is ready for the Exploration Flight Test-1 mission.   
 
 
FUTURE UPDATES 
 
The DLTRIG FSW will be updated for future Orion MPCV mission requirements including Ascent 
aborts and manual crew inputs.  Lessons learned from the EFT-1 mission and ongoing CPAS drop tests will 
provide opportunities to enhance and upgrade the FSW.   
 
The incorporation of a third string of GPS on future missions may allow the removal of the Velocity 
Trigger as a backup for the FBC Jettison.   
 
Low altitude Ascent aborts such as an engine out on the launch pad may result in skipping the drogue 
parachutes and go straight to the main parachutes.   
 
One option for improving SDR is switching SDR to monitor total rotational energy instead of rates and 
trigger drogue release on minimum energy.  Another option is to investigate changing SDR to monitor the 
angle between the rate vector and hang angle vector and have SDR command release at a minimum of this 
angle.  This may work because it could have the drogues released at the smallest possible delta from alpha 
total trim angle, resulting in the lowest possible aerodynamic moments acting on the CM during main 
deploy. 
 
With the use of off the shelf tools like the MATLAB® suite, these updates will be simple to implement, 
configure, test and analyze. 
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